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Abstract. Peter Simons has argued that the expression ‘the universe’ is not a genuine singular 
term: it can name neither a single, completely encompassing individual, nor a collection of indi-
viduals. (It is, rather, a semantically plural term standing equally for every existing object.) I 
offer reasons for resisting Simons’s arguments on both scores. 
1. Introduction 
About ten years ago Bas van Fraassen published an argument to the effect that 
‘world’ is not a count noun and, therefore, ‘the world’ is not a designator.1 Van 
Fraassen’s point was that ‘world’ is a context-dependent term whose function is 
to indicate the domain of discourse of whatever sentence it occurs in, on the oc-
casion of the utterance, and that it makes no sense to suppose that there is a 
single thing that encompasses all domains as parts—it makes no sense to 
suppose that there is such a thing as the world. Presumably, the same account 
would apply to such words as ‘universe’ and, consequently, to the semantic 
status of ‘the universe’. In a recent article, Peter Simons has argued that the 
resources of analytic ontology (about which van Fraassen expressed scepticism) 
allow us to give a different answer.2 For Simons there is indeed no such thing as 
the universe, but there is none the less a precise and perfectly legitimate sense in 
which we may speak of ‘the universe’: it is a semantically plural term standing 
equally for every existing object (like ‘the current fellows of the Royal Society’ 
is a plural term standing equally for every person that is currently a fellow of the 
Royal Society). 
Simons’s outline and defence of his positive view are compelling, and the 
view may well turn out to be the best option that is available all things consid-
ered. However, this defence builds on a pars destruens that is reminiscent of van 
Fraassen’s scepticism concerning the possibility that, to put it in the material 
                                                
1 Van Fraassen (1995). 
2 Simons (2003). 
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mode, the universe is one thing among others. Two main options are considered 
and rejected on this score: (i) that the universe is a single, completely encom-
passing individual, and (ii) that the universe is a (the) collection comprising all 
there is. Simons looks askance at both options and concludes that the expression 
‘the universe’ does not name a single fixed entity at all, whether individual or 
collective. At best it could name (iii) a system given structure by laws (physical 
or otherwise), i.e., an empirical collection whose members happen to coincide 
with the plurality of all the existing objects—but even that possibility is looked 
at somewhat sceptically. I have no qualms with regard to (iii). But I want to ar-
gue that Simons’s reasons for rejecting the first two options and concluding that 
the universe is not a single entity but a multiplicity are not as cogent as they 
look. In fact, my preference would go to option (i), but I think option (ii) is also 
available—or so I will argue. 
2. The Universe as an Individual 
Let us start with Simons’s reasons for looking askance at the idea that ‘the uni-
verse’ names a fixed individual. Simons’s misgivings here have a familiar tone. 
If the universe were an individual, then it would have to be the universal indi-
vidual—the mereological sum or fusion of all there is. But unless we assumed a 
monocategorial ontology (so that ‘all there is’ means all material objects, or all 
events, or all tropes, or what have you—an option that Simons rejects in the 
third part of his article), this universal individual would have to be awfully ger-
rymandered, and for Simons gerrymandered sums are weird. At least, such a ger-
rymandered sum would be weird, and not just in the usual sense in which the 
sum of Chisholm’s left foot and Grand Central Station—if such there be—is 
weird.3 The universal sum would be weird because it would have parts in differ-
ent ontological categories. And if it had parts in different categories, then we 
would seem to have no principled reason to accept any of the following logi-
cally exhaustive options concerning the category of the universe itself:4 
(a) The universe is in one of the categories occupied by its proper parts. (But —Simons 
says—why should a single category ‘trump’ all the others and get this exclusive 
privilege?) 
                                                
3 The charge can be traced back to Lowe (1953) and Rescher (1955); for more recent for-
mulations see e.g. Wiggins (1980), Chisholm (1987), van Inwagen (1990), and Sanford (2003). 
For a defense of the unrestricted principle of mereological fusion see Goodman (1956) and, 
more recently, Lewis (1991), Jubien (1993), and Rea (1998) inter alia. 
4 See Simons (2003), p. 238. 
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(b) The universe is in a different, sui generis category unshared by any of its 
proper parts. (But, again, why should the universe enjoy such an exclusive privi-
lege?) 
(c) The universe is in more than one category, possibly in all categories occupied by 
its proper parts. (But wouldn’t this be an ad hoc exception to the idea that catego-
ries are mutually exclusive?) 
(d) The universe is in no category at all. (And wouldn’t this be an ad hoc excep-
tion, too?) 
Now, I agree that if the universe were the only entity with parts in different 
categories, each of these options would be embarrassing and ultimately unac-
ceptable. However, the universe cannot be the only such entity. If the universe 
has parts in different categories, then so does the universe minus Chisholm’s left 
foot, or the universe minus Sebastian’s stroll in Bologna, or the universe minus 
the number 42. If the universe has parts in different categories, then so do lots of 
its proper parts: there is no obvious reason to rule out those mereological sums if 
we are considering countenancing the universal sum.5 But then the situation is 
not as bad as Simons portrays it. Options (b) would still cry for a justification 
and options (c) and (d) would remain utterly ad hoc, and for this reason alone 
unacceptable. Option (a), however, would be perfectly reasonable. Whatever 
category hosts that thing that is the universe minus Chisholm’s left foot can host 
the universe as a whole, and that category gets the privilege precisely because its 
members have parts in all categories. There would be a problem if the universe 
minus Chisholm’s left foot, the universe minus Sebastian’s stroll in Bologna, the 
universe minus the number 42, and so on, were themselves in different catego-
ries. (In that case we would be forced to put the universe in more than one cate-
gory, as per (c).) But there is no reason why that should be the case. Those parts 
of the universe are equally representative of all there is and will therefore be in 
the same category. And the whole universe can be in that category, too.  
Of course one may still wonder what category will bag those things. In 
other words, one may raise in their regard the same sceptical objections that 
Simons raises in relation to the whole universe: What are the options when it 
comes to categorizing such gerrymandered, transcategorial beasts?  
It seems to me that there are two viable options. The first is simply to say 
that such things are mere mereological sums. On the face of it, some philoso-
                                                
5 This is a bit quick. For example, Sharvy’s (1983) “quasi-mereologies” have a universal 
individual but no unrestricted fusion. However, such theories are still closed under least upper 
bounds (with respect to parthood), and for the present purposes that is enough. (On the differ-
ence between fusion and least upper bound, see Simons 1987, pp. 32ff.) 
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phers think that ‘mereological sum’ itself names an ontological category, to be 
included in a comprehensive inventory alongside various other putative catego-
ries such as object, event, trope, and so on; for they think that mereological 
sums have identity conditions of their own.6 For example, it is sometimes ar-
gued that the mereological sum of an object’s parts has different identity condi-
tions when compared to the object itself: the sum, but not the object, may sur-
vive any rearrangement of the parts; the object, but not the sum, may survive the 
annihilation of some parts; and so on. Thus, if mereological sums form a cate-
gory of their own, then that category would fit the bill. It would host the uni-
verse just as it would host its gerrymandered parts, unless of course one worries 
about the legitimacy of such parts in the first place.  
I personally do not find this option attractive, for I do not share the view 
that a thing is different from the mereological sum of its parts, 7 hence I see no 
reason to think that mereological sums form a category of their own. But then 
another option suggests itself naturally. If a thing is just the sum of its parts, and 
if the parts belong to different categories, when none of these categories is pow-
erful enough to trump the others the thing will have to belong to a different 
category. Now, if the universe were the only case where this happens, positing a 
new category would be unacceptably sui generis. But the universe would not be 
the only case where this happens. We have just seen that the universe would be-
long to the category of some of its parts, namely the category of such parts as 
that thing that is the universe minus Chisholm’s left foot. It is such more basic 
hybrids as, say, the sum of Chisholm’s left foot and Sebastian’s stroll in Bolo-
gna that might call for a special category. That thing is not an object, as 
Chisholm’s left foot is; and it is not an event, which is what Sebastian’s stroll is. 
The foot+stroll is a different sort of thing. But this would not mean that we need 
a sui generis category for this purpose, a category unshared by anything else. 
Lots of other things will be in the same category as the sum of Chisholm’s left 
foot and Sebastian’s stroll in Bologna—for example, the sum of Chisholm’s 
right foot and Sebastian’s stroll in Bologna, or the sum of Chisholm’s right foot 
and Sebastian’s stroll in Prague. Generally speaking, there is nothing wrong or 
peculiar in the thought that a transcategorial sum belongs to a different category 
than any of its single-category parts, for this would not be an exclusive privilege 
but a common feature of a large variety of hybrid things.  
                                                
6 See Wiggins (1980) and Lowe (1989) inter alia. The view is defended also by Simons 
(1987). 
7 More generally, I accept the principle of mereological extensionality, whose main moti-
vation goes back once again to Goodman (1956). See Casati and Varzi (1999), cap. 3. 
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In the end, then, the objection to treating the universe as an all-encompas-
sing individual must boil down to a general objection against hybrid, transcate-
gorial entities—not because there is no coherent way to classify them, but be-
cause the necessary categories to classify them might not be as “natural” as oth-
ers. Actually, there is no compulsion to suppose that we always need a new 
category to accommodate transcategorial sums. Perhaps in some cases there is 
already a good category available to do the job. (For instance, perhaps the mere-
ological sum of an object and a property may be classified as a fact, and this 
category might already be needed to classify other ontological beasts—sums of 
events and properties, say, or atomic facts.) But it seems clear that in a poly-
categorial ontology at least some trascategorial sums call for unheard-of catego-
ries. And in the end this is the issue: What do we do in such cases? Shall we de-
clare non-existent all those sums for which our palette of ontological categories 
is too poor? Shall we only accept intracategorial sums? No matter how we an-
swer them, these are not questions about the universe but general questions 
about mereology and the theory of categories broadly understood. 
I for one am inclined to be quite liberal in this regard. For one thing, not 
only do I think that a thing is identical with the mereological sum of its constitu-
ent parts. I also share the view that a thing is ‘nothing over and above’ its parts,8  
hence I don’t think the question of the existence of a mereological sum makes 
much sense in case we already agree on the existence of the pieces. The sum is 
just the pieces ‘counted loosely’, as some like to say.9 I hold this to be true of 
“natural”, categorially homogeneous sums, such as the sum of Chisholm’s left 
foot and the rest of his body, as well as hybrid, trascategorial sums, such as the 
sum of Chisholm’s left foot and Sebastian’s stroll. We may feel uneasy about 
treating the latter as bona fide entities (which is why we have a hard time com-
ing up with good names and category labels), but this psychological fact has no 
bearing on the question of their ontological status. Actually, in some cases we 
may even feel at home with a transcategorial sum. Take a tornado—say hurri-
cane Gloria. An object? Not really: the water molecules, the leaves, and the 
other stuff that is involved in the hurricane might all be objects, but the hurri-
cane is something over and above all that. An event, then? No—because hurri-
canes move, or so we find it natural to say, while events are temporally extended 
and thus it makes no sense to say that they move. There are lots of little events 
                                                
8 Lewis 1991, 81. The phrase (and the ‘ontological innocence’ of mereology that it is 
meant to capture) has been questioned by various people, most notably van Inwagen 1994, Yi 
1999, and Merricks 1999. My own reasons in support of the view are detailed in Varzi 2000.  
9 Baxter 1988, p. 580.  
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involved in Gloria, but the hurricane itself is something over and above such 
events. So maybe we can say that Gloria includes both objects and events as 
parts—it is a transcategorial sum. Yet it is a perfectly “natural” entity. (There 
maybe some indeterminacy as to whether we should say that a water molecule is 
a part of or a participant in Gloria, but this very fact shows that both options are 
prima facie plausible.) 
Moreover, even within the range of categorially homogeneous sums there 
are lots of weird, gerrymandered candidates. Just to run through some familiar 
examples, consider a sum of spatially disconnected things, such as Chisholm’s 
left foot and Quine’s right foot. Or consider a sum of things that do not co-exist, 
such as Chisholm’s left foot and Descartes’s right foot. Or, again, consider a 
sum of things that are connected and co-exist, but are nevertheless heterogene-
ous in some sense, such as a glass and the wine inside it, or a doughnut and the 
volume of air that fills the hole. To some philosophers, sums such as these are 
just as problematic as genuinely transcategorial sums. But then we know it’s 
hard to draw a line. In our universe everything is odd and gerrymandered to a 
degree. Even a smooth surface may, on closer look, be like the top of a fakir’s 
bed of nails (to borrow a nice phrase of Simons’s 10). All things are on closer 
look like the figures of a Seurat painting, so what shall we do—get rid of them 
all? I’d rather keep them all. The question of what figures are salient and what 
aren’t—what sums are natural and what aren’t—is an interesting one, but it has 
no ontological significance. Who are we to decide what there is and what there 
isn’t on the basis of our standards for salience and ontological beauty, let alone 
our modest apparatus of categorial distinctions?  
(There are many interesting cases in sciences, too, where the lack of catego-
ries proved problematic. When Marco Polo saw the rhinoceroses in Java, the 
best he could do was to classify them as unicorns. When the Aztecs hastened to 
the coast to witness the landing of the first conquistadores, they thought the 
Spaniards were riding deer because they could not think of a different sort of 
quadruped of that size. Not to mention the Australian colonists who first ran into 
that weird ‘duck-billed’ animal we now call the platypus. What sort of beast was 
that? Not a mole, because of the beak. Not a duck, because of the four legs. Not 
a mammal, because it laid eggs. Not a reptile, because it had warm blood. Still 
in 1800 the German anatomist Johann Blumenbach came up with the name Or-
nithorynchus paradoxus. Not a good name, perhaps, but a telling one: one way 
or the other the beast was there and a new category was wanted.11) 
                                                
10 Simons (1991), p. 91. Maybe all boundaries are like that? See Smith and Varzi (2000). 
11 I am taking these examples from Ritvo (1997) and Eco (2000). 
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3. The Universe as a Set 
So my moral is that Simons’s reasons for ruling out the first hypothesis, to the 
effect that ‘the universe’ names a single, completely encompassing individual, 
are not conclusive. Let me now move to the second main option considered and 
rejected by Simons, namely that the expression ‘the universe’ names a fixed col-
lection of individuals—a set (or class). Simons says this can’t be right, and for 
two independent reasons.12 First, if it were a set it would belong to a specific 
ontological category, while its members may be of different categories. It would 
be an abstract entity and would not, therefore, partake of the nature of its non-
abstract elements; it would only touch them at arm’s length. Second, if the uni-
verse were a set it would have to be the universal set, a set containing every-
thing including itself, and under standard set-theoretic assumptions there is no 
such set.  
The first concern is the analogue of the one discussed above with reference 
to (a): the universe qua transcategorial set cannot belong to one and only one of 
the categories occupied by its members, for why should a single category get 
this exclusive privilege? Why should the category of sets trump all the others 
and get the exclusive? I agree that this can be an embarrassing question. And it 
is precisely because sets are abstract that I am not inclined to think of the uni-
verse as a set but as an individual of some sort—the merelogical sum of all there 
is. But once again I don’t think the issue is a serious one for those who do like 
the prospects of the universe as a set. For them, the category of sets gets to host 
the universe because that is what the universe is. Take the set whose members 
comprise all the fellows of the Royal Society plus all of their singletons. Is there 
a problem in the fact that this set is in the same ontological category as some of 
its members but not others—that it embodies the nature of just one of its kinds? 
Surely not. It is a transcategorial set, but a set none the less. Well, then, the same 
may be true of the universe. Sets are powerful entities—they tend to take over.  
As for the second reason, it is certainly correct that under standard assump-
tions about the existence of sets there is no such thing as the universal set. And 
neither is the very idea of a universal set a popular one. This is not to say, how-
ever, that it is formally incoherent or otherwise unworkable. Examples of non-
standard set theories in which the universe is a set among others can already be 
found in the works of Quine and Church,13 and today the topic is gaining inter-
est among logicians and mathematicians alike. The motivations may be varied; 
                                                
12 Simons (2003), p. 238. 
13 See Quine (1937) and Church (1974). 
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but it is remarkable, for instance, that the opening page of the first book devoted 
entirely to this sort of set theory includes a statement bearing explicitly on our 
subject matter:  
One would naturally want the universe to be a set, since, if one thing is certain in 
this life, it is that everything is identical with itself, so we cannot avoid having the 
universe as the extension of the predicate of self-identity.14 
One problem with such theories, of course, is that we are inclined to infer 
the non-existence of the universal set from Russell’s paradox. But that’s a mis-
take. Russell’s paradox depends on the existence of the set of all sets which are 
not members of themselves, {x: x ∉ x}, and this is not something that follows 
directly from the existence of a universal set. It would follow if we assumed an 
unrestricted separation axiom, whereby every subclass of a set is a set. But one 
can go a long way in set theory without the full strength of such an axiom. For 
another illustration, some might be inclined to reject the universal set because of 
Cantor’s paradox. If the universal set U existed, it would have to include its own 
power set, ℘U, which is impossible. Again, however, this need not be the case. 
That impossibility depends on a diagonal argument where we assume a surjec-
tive function ƒ: U → ℘U to be given and we consider the set of all things that 
are not members of their ƒ-values, i.e., {x ∈ U: x ∉ ƒ(x)}. Plainly, the existence 
of this set follows from the unrestricted separation axiom, if U exists; but it does 
not follow from U’s existence alone. 
So there is no obvious reason, from a purely set-theoretic perspective, why 
the universe can’t be a set. It might be necessary to impose further restrictions 
on our intuitions about abstraction, but such restrictions may well have different 
and independently good motivations. (For instance, one may be inclined to al-
low only stratified sets, following Quine’s advice, and that would be enough to 
have U without paradox.)  
There is, to be sure, a third reason suggested by Simons against the thought 
of identifying the universe with a set. Simons hints at it with reference to a 
slightly different version of that thought, according to which the universe is a 
proper class, but the difference is not significant: the main point is that if the 
universe were a set (class) it would be a unique collection of elements, while it 
would seem that the universe has no unique decomposition.15 I think this objec-
tion bites deeper. It is precisely this sort of consideration that leads some phi-
                                                
14 Forster (1992), p. 1. 
15 Simons (2003), p. 238. 
9 
losophers to view mereology as better suited to ontology than set theory: it does 
not require that we specify some level of ultimate entities—the Urelemente—
from out of which everything else is constructed.16 (Indeed, mereology is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that there is no level of ultimate entities—that every-
thing is made out of atomless gunk.) So metaphysically, if not formally, this 
would provide us with good reasons to look askance at the identification of the 
universe with a set or class. But there is an obvious reply to this line of objec-
tion. For it only applies if it is indeed assumed that the universal set is built out 
of Urelemente that admit of no further decomposition, and surely this assump-
tion is not granted. Unless we buy into a monocategorial ontology consisting ex-
clusively of sets (hardly a plausible assumption outside the realm of pure mathe-
matics), the Urelemente of set theory may be things of various sorts, including 
material objects of the garden variety. And such objects may have all the mere-
ological structure one wishes. So at least two options present themselves:  
(e) The universe, construed as the universal set, encompasses everything that exists, 
although some of the things it encompasses (the proper parts of its Urelemente) are 
not included among its elements. 
(f) The universe, construed as the universal set, includes everything that exists 
among its members, the proper parts of its Urelemente not being things that exist 
in actuality.  
Both of these options are perfectly consistent and some might even think that 
one of them is correct. For instance, option (e) is germane to a mereologised 
version of set theory such as David Lewis’s.17 And option (f) could be defended 
on the assumption that the relevant proper parts of the Urelemente are (arbitrary) 
undetached parts, together with Peter van Inwagen’s reasons for not taking such 
parts to be things that exist in and of themselves.18 Once again, it is not my pur-
pose here to defend any of these options. My concern is merely with the ques-
tion of their tenability. And tenable they are.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
Simons is right, of course, in emphasizing certain virtues of his account vis-à-vis 
the options that I have been reviewing. In particular, if ‘the universe’ is not a 
                                                
16 See e.g. Bochman (1990) and Smith (1995) for explicit formulations of this view. 
17 See Lewis (1991) (though Lewis’s actual formulation of the theory has no universal set 
but, rather, a universal proper class). 
18 See van Inwagen (1981). 
10 
proper singular term but a semantically plural term standing for a plural collec-
tion—a genuine multiplicity of things of various sorts—then the recurrent prob-
lem of the categorial status of the universe dissolves altogether. As a multiplic-
ity, the universe would straddle any ontological divide among its members, so 
we would not have to force it all into a single category. (And Simons goes a re-
markably long way towards showing the formal consistency of this account, 
even on the hypothesis that the categories form a full type-theoretic hierarchy.) 
By means of conclusion, however, let me take one more look at the source of 
that recurrent problem—the categorization of the universe. Exactly what counts 
as an ontological category is not entirely clear, as we can categorize at different 
levels. So what exactly is the worry raised by the assumption that a good ontol-
ogy ought to be polycategorial?  
Consider the opposition between continuants and occurrents. Simons re-
gards this opposition to reflect a bicategorial ontology (like the opposition be-
tween substances and tropes, or that between concrete and abstract entities) and 
argues that, if both categories have members, it would be illegitimate to classify 
the universe one way or the other for the sorts of reasons already discussed 
above.19 I take it that Simons is here thinking of the continuant/occurrent dis-
tinction as corresponding to the traditional object/event distinction, and surely 
many philosophers would go along with such a parallel. A rotating sphere is a 
continuant; the rotation of the sphere is an occurrent. None the less there is room 
for flexibility here. Suppose we hold—as a growing number of philosophers 
do— that objects are not continuants but occurrents. That is, suppose we hold 
that objects are four-dimensional entities that persist through time by having dif-
ferent temporal parts at different times, just like events.20 Would this mean that 
we are forced into the flatness of a monocategorial ontology? As a matter of his-
torical fact, four-dimensionalists have indeed favoured the affirmative answer. 
Quine, for one, held explicitly that in his desert landscapes there is no signifi-
cant distinction between a material object and an event:  
Each comprises simply the content, however heterogeneous, of some portion of 
space-time, however disconnected or gerrymandered. What then distinguishes 
material substances from other physical objects is a detail: if an object is a sub-
stance, there are relatively few atoms that lie partly in it (temporally) and partly 
outside.21 
                                                
19 Simons (2003), p. 240. 
20 Recent proponents of this view include Lewis (1986), Heller, (1990), Sider (2001), and 
Hudson (2001). 
21 Quine (1960), p. 131. 
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However, a four-dimensionalist need not go along with this flat picture. The 
doctrine of temporal parts, understood as a conception of how things persist 
through time, is independent of the question of whether two or more distinct oc-
currents can share the same region of space-time, just as the theory of contin-
uants is independent of the question of whether two or more distinct continuants 
can occupy the same region of space.22 And if two or more distinct occurrents 
can share the same region of space-time, nothing prevents them from being oc-
currents of different sorts. Nothing prohibits a four-dimensionalist from distin-
guishing a 4D rotating sphere from its 4D rotation.  
Again, I am not advocating this view here. But to the extent that it is a co-
herent view, it brings out a difficult question underlying the very idea of a poly-
categorial ontology, and the thought that the universe sits ill with it. On the view 
under discussion there are only occurrents, but the occurrents may be of such a 
variety as to do justice to the intuitive distinction between objects and events. So 
the underlying ontology would be, in one sense, monocategorial, but in another 
sense it would be just as fine-grained as a bicategorial ontology. Being a mono-
categorial ontology, the universe (construed now as an individual as opposed to 
a set) would be just one entity among others. At the same time, because of its in-
ternal differentiation, one might still worry about whether the universe is object-
like or event-like (or neither). Would this be a serious worry? I say it would not. 
If the differentiation is not categorial—if objects and events are just different 
sorts of things belonging to the same broad ontological category of occurrents—
then the worry would not be genuinely ontological. It would be an instance of a 
typical and yet immaterial worry that arises every time we set out to mereolo-
gise with things that are not, at some level of analysis, exactly alike. (Compare 
worrying about whether the mereological sum of a statue and the clay constitut-
ing it, on the assumption that they are distinct, is statue-like or clay-like.)  
I do not mean to suggest that the notion of an ontological category is up for 
grabs. But neither do I take it to be a truism that all sortal discriminations should 
correspond to ontologically significant categorial distinctions. As it stands, the 
desideratum of a polycategorial ontology is too generic to be an hindrance for 
the friends of the universe. We may part company with them on the grounds of 
our overall metaphysical views. But we may likewise side with them, precisely 
on those grounds.  
                                                
22 For instance, Wiggins (1968), Doepke (1982), Johnston (1992), and Lowe (1995) (along 
with Simons 1985) think that co-location of continuants is possible; Robinson (1982), Burke 
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